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ASPIRATIONS, INNOVATION, AND CORPORATE 
VENTURE CAPITAL: A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE
VIBHA GABA* and SHANTANU BHATTACHARYA
INSEAD, Singapore
This study takes an organizational decision-making perspective to examine when fi rms are 
likely to utilize CVC units as a mechanism for externalizing R&D. We draw insights from the 
behavioral theory of the fi rm to argue that managerial aspirations for innovation-related goals 
are an important driver of CVC initiatives within fi rms. We test our argument by examining 
both the adoption and termination of CVC units for a sample of information technology fi rms 
from 1992 to 2003. Results show that a fi rm is more likely to adopt and less likely to terminate 
a CVC unit when its innovation performance is closest to its social aspirations. Copyright © 
2012 Strategic Management Society.
INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurial start-ups have become an important 
source of innovative technologies, products, and 
business models. Hence, many established fi rms 
have sought to accelerate innovation and foster 
growth by creating their own corporate venture 
capital (CVC) units. These units emulate private 
venture capital practices by making external equity 
investments in a portfolio of high-potential entrepre-
neurial start-ups (Gaba and Meyer, 2008). A CVC 
unit enables fi rms to access a wide range of nascent 
technologies with promising (albeit uncertain) future 
potential (Chesbrough, 2003; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 
2005).
The 1990s boom in the venture capital (VC) 
industry encouraged many fi rms to create CVC units 
as a mechanism for externalizing R&D. The corpo-
rate share of overall VC investing increased from 2 
percent in 1994 to 15 percent in 2000, when more 
than 300 fi rms invested nearly $16 billion (SDC, 
2005). By mid-2000, some 350 CVC units were 
reported to exist worldwide, up from fewer than a 
dozen in 1990 (SDC, 2001). But in late 2000, a 
recession and the collapse of the equity and IPO 
markets brought almost all VC investing to a halt. 
During the fi rst quarter of 2001, CVC investments 
fell 81 percent and many fi rms shut down their CVC 
units (SDC, 2005). Thus, the era of CVC investing 
was marked by a wave of enthusiasm followed by 
disillusionment (Chesbrough, 2000; Meyer, Gaba, 
and Colwell, 2005).
Nevertheless, some fi rms continued to view CVC 
as a powerful mechanism for identifying new ideas 
and potentially disruptive technologies. As one CVC 
manager in a prominent information technology fi rm 
put it: ‘Corporate venturing is a dynamic way to 
develop strategy. Creating a discipline in your 
company to evaluate an entrepreneur’s business plan 
is a valuable asset irrespective of whether you make 
any money in the venture effort. Even when the deal 
fl ow is down, we add value because we are part of 
a very innovative venturing community. There is 
still a lot of innovation going on out there, and we 
deliver (to the parent corporation) our perspective 
on this month-in and month-out.’
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Like all venture capital investors, CVC units 
expect to realize fi nancial returns. However, most 
fi rms cite innovation-related objectives as their main 
reason for setting up CVC units (MacMillan et al., 
2008). Such investing is pursued in order to acceler-
ate innovation by discovering new technologies, 
products, and business models (Chesbrough, 2002; 
Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005; Wadhwa and Kotha, 
2006; Benson and Ziedonis, 2009). Yet transplanting 
private VC practices into a public corporation is 
fraught with risks for several reasons (Gompers and 
Lerner, 2001; Gaba and Meyer, 2008). It is diffi cult 
to predict the benefi ts, most of which become evident 
only in the long run. Moreover, implementation 
requires coordination among organizational subunits 
as well as changes in organizational routines, both 
of which may face internal resistance that could limit 
the integration of external technology into the fi rm’s 
knowledge base (Chesbrough, 2006). A decision to 
pursue CVC is, therefore, risky from an organiza-
tional perspective, but it holds the promise of sub-
stantial benefi ts to fi rms that successfully adopt and 
retain a CVC unit.
A number of studies examining the diffusion of 
organizational practices have identifi ed social, insti-
tutional, and contextual factors that affect the rate 
and form of diffusing practices (e.g., Strang and 
Meyer, 1993; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997; 
Gaba and Meyer, 2008). Mechanisms said to drive 
diffusion include rational choice, faddish emulation, 
pursuit of legitimacy, and contagion (Strang and 
Soule, 1998; Birkinshaw, Hamel, and Mol, 2008). 
However, most diffusion studies pay less attention 
to factors within a fi rm that infl uence the adoption 
of practices than to their transmission between fi rms 
(Meyer and Goes, 1988; Fiss, Kennedy, and Davis, 
forthcoming). When uncertain, decision makers may 
simply follow the example of other fi rms or conform 
to the institutional environment’s demands. This per-
spective presupposes a straightforward relationship 
between fi rm motives and collective outcomes; it 
assumes that when fi rms reach the same decision 
(say, to adopt a new practice), they have acted on 
the basis of similar preferences or analyses. This 
tells us little about why fi rms choose not to adopt a 
practice, and diffusion research has paid little atten-
tion to the termination of previously adopted 
practices.
The behavioral theory of the fi rm (Cyert and 
March, 1963) offers a framework better suited to 
modeling fi rms’ decisions to accept the risks of 
establishing a CVC unit and then to either continue 
or terminate it. Cyert and March (1963: 2) argue 
that ‘theory should model organizational processes, 
and should be generated through systematic obser-
vation of processes in actual organizations.’ 
Accordingly, behavioral theory rejects the notion 
that fi rms are rational, profi t-maximizing units; 
instead, they consist of political coalitions among 
subunits reaching decisions that ‘satisfi ce’ by repeat-
ing actions likely to yield desired performance levels 
in pursuit of ‘factored’ goals. Failure to achieve 
these aspirations is said to trigger ‘problemistic 
search’ that can lead fi rms to alter their programmed 
actions. It has been shown in a range of studies that 
performance–aspiration gaps motivate greater 
responses toward goal achievement (Lant, Milliken, 
and Batra, 1992) and, as a result, serve as a powerful 
mechanism to initiate action (Greve 2003b) and risk 
taking (Fiegenbaum and Thomas 1988; Bromiley, 
1991).
This study takes an organizational decision-
making perspective to examine when fi rms are likely 
to employ CVC units as a mechanism for external-
izing R&D. Specifi cally, we examine the conditions 
under which the organizational risks associated with 
CVC units becomes more or less acceptable to 
decision makers in a context characterized by strong 
institutional pressures to expand and withdraw from 
CVC activity. This focus on organizational decision 
making allows us to examine the heterogeneity in 
organizational responses to externalizing R&D via 
CVC units and so enables a deeper understanding 
of the fi rms’ motives. We develop hypotheses about 
a fi rm’s propensity to adopt or terminate CVC units 
as a function of its performance aspirations for 
innovation-related goals. We test our predictions 
using a sample of Forbes 500 fi rms in the informa-
tion technology (IT) sector for the years 1992 to 
2003.
This article makes two contributions. First, we 
contribute to the growing body of research on fi rms’ 
strategic responses to a common institutional envi-
ronment by drawing on the behavioral theory of the 
fi rm to explain how fi rms make decisions under con-
ditions of risk and uncertainty. In so doing, we 
explain why fi rms facing seemingly similar events 
or pressures respond with actions that are consistent 
with (or depart from) those of others in the same 
environment. Second, we contribute to the technol-
ogy entrepreneurship literature by specifying the 
conditions under which fi rms are more likely to 
pursue corporate venture capital initiatives as a part 
of their innovation strategy. Our study draws atten-
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tion to performance aspirations for innovation goals 
as an important mechanism affecting this decision. 
Finally, by investigating both decisions to adopt and 
terminate CVC units, we offer a more comprehen-
sive understanding of how fi rms organize for inno-
vation and growth.
EXTERNAL R&D AND CVC UNITS
Firms have traditionally emphasized R&D alliances, 
joint ventures, licensing agreements, and acquisi-
tions as ways to tap knowledge sources external to 
the fi rm (Veugelers, 1997; Jones, Lanctot, and 
Teegen, 2001; Zhang, Badenfuller, and Mangematin, 
2007). More recently, CVC units have become 
widely recognized as a conduit for externalizing 
R&D. Corporate VC investments typically focus on 
technologies in relatively early stages of develop-
ment and whose potential commercial value is 
highly uncertain. The CVC units follow venture 
capital practice of making staged investments, which 
allows them to gather information about entrepre-
neurial start-ups, monitor their progress, and main-
tain fl exibility to defer commitment until a 
technology’s value and the size of its market become 
better known.
The burgeoning literature on CVC shows a strong 
consensus that fi rms pursue CVC units for strategic 
reasons linked to their innovation goals. A CVC unit 
offers both exploratory and exploitative benefi ts to 
an established fi rm (Basu, Wadhwa, and Kotha, 
forthcoming). Exploratory benefi ts include 
insights—into new and emerging markets, technolo-
gies, and business models—from access to a range 
of entrepreneurial start-ups (Benson and Ziedonis, 
2009). Exploitative benefi ts include access to tech-
nologies that fi ll gaps in a fi rm’s innovation portfolio 
(Dushnitsky, 2006) and leverage its existing knowl-
edge and technologies to enter new markets through 
start-ups (Chesbrough, 2003).
Yet the innovation-related benefi ts of CVC units 
can be realized only when the new knowledge, tech-
nologies, or products developed by an entrepreneur-
ial start-up are integrated back into the parent 
corporation. Assimilating external knowledge gen-
erated through CVC units is challenging and risky 
since external R&D is often perceived by in-house 
R&D personnel as an implicit indictment of their 
own R&D efforts; it must overcome the ‘not invented 
here’ (NIH) syndrome. It requires the active support 
and cooperation of the fi rm’s R&D and business 
units, since it may entail signifi cant changes in their 
existing R&D routines and related processes 
(Chesbrough, 2006). Moreover, CVC’s potential 
benefi ts are not so easily assessed: they are long 
term, uncertain, and diffi cult to quantify. Hence, it 
is not surprising that, despite the potential innova-
tion-related benefi ts, fi rms struggle to sustain CVC 
units over time (Chesbrough, 2003); in fact, a typical 
unit shuts down after operating for only four years 
(Gompers, 2002). Thus, risk considerations must be 
combined with innovation goals to examine the con-
ditions under which fi rms are motivated to adopt and 
persist with a CVC unit.
In the next section, we develop such a model. Our 
objective is to understand the conditions under 
which a fi rm is willing to undertake the organiza-
tional risks associated with deploying CVC units to 
capture external R&D. We draw insights from the 
behavioral theory of the fi rm to develop hypotheses 
about how organizational processes of performance 
evaluation, search, and decision making affect CVC 
adoption and termination.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
In the behavioral view, organizations are goal-
directed systems that use simple decision heuristics 
to adapt behavior in response to performance feed-
back. A core idea in the behavioral theory of the fi rm 
is that decision makers use an aspiration level, which 
is ‘the smallest outcome that would be deemed sat-
isfactory by the decision maker’ (Schneider, 1992: 
1053) to evaluate performance. Decisions made with 
reference to aspiration levels are the result of bound-
edly rational decision makers attempting to simplify 
evaluation by transforming a continuous measure of 
performance into a discrete measure of success or 
failure (Greve 2003b). A given aspiration level pro-
vides a performance reference point, and the theory 
explores whether and how performance gaps (i.e., 
the divergence between achieved performance and 
aspiration level) motivates organizational search, 
risk taking, and change.
Prior research has examined fi rms’ R&D activi-
ties through the behavioral theory lens. Studies 
fi nd that performance below aspirations motivates 
fi rms to invest more in internal R&D (Hundley, 
Jacobson, and Park, 1996; Chen and Miller, 2007; 
Chen, 2008). Performance improvements above 
aspirations, however, decrease internal R&D inten-
sity (Greve, 2003a). Taken together, these studies 
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support the view that performance feedback affects 
a fi rm’s ability to make adjustments in internal 
R&D intensity. Yet few studies have explored the 
effect of performance feedback on a fi rm’s pro-
pensity to change its innovation strategy to include 
external R&D modes.1 Moreover, in examining the 
effect of performance feedback on internal R&D 
intensity, prior research has mainly used fi nancial 
performance (e.g., return on assets) as the pre-
dominant goal variable. While fi nancial perfor-
mance goals are one particular type of goal, fi rms 
seek to meet aspirations levels on multiple goals 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 
2009; Greve, 2008), and the operative goals for 
any decision are those of the subunit making that 
decision. From a behavioral perspective, goals that 
are not closely matched to a given organizational 
activity may be ineffective because ill-defi ned prob-
lems will likely prevent the organization from 
initiating search (Greve, 2003b). Since accounting 
measures of overall performance, such as return 
on assets, clearly lack specifi city, in this study, we 
examine the decision to externalize R&D via CVC 
units in relation to a fi rm’s innovation-related goals. 
In addition to fi nancial goals, fi rms in high-tech 
industries often pursue goals related to technologi-
cal innovation (Chesbrough, 2003). A continuous 
stream of innovations in such industries can be a 
critical source of competitive advantage and stra-
tegic renewal (Burgelman, 1994; Rosenbloom and 
Christensen, 1994; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). 
More generally, since external sources of knowledge 
are critical to a fi rm’s ability to innovate (Cassiman 
and Veugelers 2006), it may resort to external R&D 
when it faces diffi culties generating innovation 
internally (Desyllas and Hughes, 2008; Vermeulen 
and Barkema, 2001). So unlike overall fi nancial 
performance, innovation performance goals should 
allow managers to more easily attribute performance 
shortfalls to the location of performance problems. 
Managers may fi nd it relatively straightforward to 
identify the problems associated with a decline in 
the innovation performance relative to aspirations 
and, in an attempt to resolve the performance dis-
crepancy, may pursue new modes (e.g., CVC units) 
for conducting R&D.
Innovation performance feedback and adoption 
of CVC units
When innovation performance is above aspirations, 
fi rms will have little motivation to adopt CVC units 
for conducting external R&D. First, a fi rm will be 
motivated to invest in external start-ups if it believes 
that the knowledge required to generate innovations 
lies outside the fi rm’s boundaries and that the 
start-ups are valuable sources of such knowledge 
(Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). Firms with high inno-
vation performance may conclude that the learning 
benefi ts from such external R&D would be limited; 
hence such fi rms will have little motivation to estab-
lish CVC units to assimilate and act on the knowledge 
generated through entrepreneurial start-ups.
Second, a fi rm may view its internal R&D capa-
bilities as a crucial determinant of technological 
competitiveness. Because creating a CVC unit real-
locates internal resources (to identify and integrate 
externally generated technologies), internal R&D 
and business units may resist such initiatives. The 
consequent possibility of losing a competitive 
advantage may well dissuade fi rms from employing 
CVC units as a mechanism for externalizing R&D. 
Therefore, we expect that increasing performance 
gaps above a fi rm’s aspirations for innovation per-
formance will reduce the fi rm’s likelihood of estab-
lishing a CVC unit.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): As innovation performance 
increases above aspirations, the probability of 
adopting a CVC unit decreases.
The converse of this hypothesis is that a fi rm 
whose innovation performance is declining should 
view CVC as a means to revitalize and enhance its 
technological base (Desyllas and Hughes, 2008). By 
investing in a variety of entrepreneurial start-ups, 
such fi rms can broaden their technology trajectories 
and thereby avoid the inertia resulting from repeated 
exploitation of their internal knowledge bases 
(Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006). At the same time, low 
performance increases managerial tolerance for risk 
because managers view performance below aspira-
tions as a loss situation, and they are willing to take 
risks to improve it (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979); 
thus, the need for improvement increases a fi rm’s 
likelihood of adopting a CVC unit.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): As innovation performance 
falls below aspirations, the probability of adopt-
ing a CVC unit increases.
1
 Bolton (1993) surveys 74 high-tech fi rms to investigate the 
relationship between a fi rm’s fi nancial performance and its 
decision to join an R&D consortium. The results did not statisti-
cally support the hypothesis that low performance motivates 
fi rms to join such consortia.
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So far we have argued for the effect of a perfor-
mance–aspiration gap on the fi rm’s willingness to 
adopt CVC units. But what happens after adoption? 
Does the fi rm continue to view CVC units as an 
effective means for achieving its innovation-related 
goals? How do the associated organizational risks 
affect whether or not a CVC unit is terminated? 
Next, we develop hypotheses related to the effect of 
the innovation performance-aspiration gap on a 
fi rm’s decision to continue or terminate CVC units.
Innovation performance feedback and 
termination of CVC units
Innovation performance feedback can have different 
implications for the decision to continue or termi-
nate a CVC unit. This is due, in part, to the fact that 
externalizing R&D through a CVC unit requires that 
the fi rm not only allocate resources to the CVC 
initiative but also reorganize its R&D routines and 
processes to exploit those resources effectively. A 
fi rm needs to maintain a close interface between the 
CVC unit and its internal R&D and business units. 
For example, when evaluating and selecting invest-
ment opportunities, CVC managers must communi-
cate with these in-house units in order to understand 
their interests and operating strategies, the current 
technological trajectories, and any technological 
gaps. At the same time, CVCs draw on the technical 
and business expertise of the fi rm’s R&D and busi-
ness units to evaluate new technologies available 
from entrepreneurial start-ups. Moreover, innova-
tion-related benefi ts that could result from CVC 
investments will not be realized unless the new 
knowledge, technologies, or products are success-
fully integrated into the parent fi rm. Accomplishing 
such knowledge transfers almost always requires 
new routines and practices, which may run counter 
to managers’ assumptions based on established R&D 
processes (Chesbrough, 2003). In addition to the 
challenge of transforming ingrained routines 
(Chesbrough, 2006), cultural change is usually 
needed to encourage a more receptive attitude 
toward external ideas and knowledge (Huston and 
Sakkab, 2006). So even in the post-adoption phase, 
a fi rm’s decision to persist with a CVC unit depends 
on its willingness to take risks and overcome the 
inertia of existing R&D structures and processes 
(Kanter, 1988; Gilbert, 2005).
When innovation performance is above aspira-
tions and improving, it can cause managers to focus 
on the existing R&D routines and practices because 
managers tend to repeat actions associated with 
positive outcomes. It can also lead them to become 
more committed to retaining proven R&D processes 
because doing so is more effi cient than developing 
new ones (Cyert and March, 1963). Innovation per-
formance above aspirations may reinforce rigid 
beliefs about the link between performance and 
existing innovation strategy (Prahalad and Bettis, 
1986) and increase feelings of self-effi cacy (Audia, 
Locke, and Smith, 2000), resulting not only in com-
placency but also in the rejection of newer, alterna-
tive mechanisms for conducting R&D. Thus, internal 
R&D and business units are more likely to see only 
the virtue and superiority of their own ideas and 
technical activities while dismissing the potential 
contributions and benefi ts of a CVC unit as inferior 
and weak (Katz and Allen,1982).2 This perceptual 
outlook is especially likely to be stronger if the inno-
vation performance is signifi cantly higher than aspi-
rations. In such situations, managers will likely 
resist the development of new R&D routines and 
thereby amplify the coordination challenges for a 
CVC unit, leading eventually to the termination of 
such a unit.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Conditional on the adoption 
of a CVC unit, as innovation performance 
increases above aspirations, the probability of 
terminating a CVC unit increases.
When performance is below aspirations and dete-
riorating, it can stimulate problemistic search and 
risk taking (Cyert and March, 1963); however, it can 
also increase reliance on more conventional and 
well-learned responses (Ocasio, 1995). For example, 
in a multi-case study of eight newspaper organiza-
tions, Gilbert (2005) found that in threatening situ-
ations, even if fi rms were motivated to overcome 
resource constraints and create online news ven-
tures, it amplifi ed routine rigidity leading fi rms to 
remain focused on preexisting routines of develop-
ing news content and run the newspaper business. 
So even if negative innovation performance feed-
back triggers the adoption of CVC units as an alter-
native mechanism for conducting R&D, in the face 
of continual performance shortfalls, internal R&D 
and business unit managers may decide to refocus 
on well-known R&D routines related to the fi rm’s 
2
 For example, fl ush from its successful user interface innova-
tions of the 1980s, engineers at Apple Computer rejected newer 
ideas in areas such as handheld computers, using the phrase 
‘NIH’ to describe such rejection (Kaplan, 1996: 156).
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core innovation strategy. Performance shortfalls 
may also amplify the fear of resource cannibaliza-
tion (Gilbert, 2005) which, in turn, may curtail or 
even preclude the organizational fl exibility needed 
to coordinate CVC-related initiatives (Kanter, 1988). 
Moreover, negative performance feedback in the 
post-adoption phase can intensify concerns about the 
effectiveness of CVC units as a source of new ideas 
and knowledge and, in this way, focus attention 
more on tried and tested R&D processes rather than 
on developing new ones. This loss of managerial 
focus on deploying practices to integrate new knowl-
edge and technologies identifi ed through CVC 
investments will eventually lead to the termination 
of CVC units.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Conditional on the adoption 
of a CVC unit, as innovation performance 
decreases below aspirations, the probability of 
terminating a CVC unit increases.
METHOD
Sample
To test our hypotheses, we gathered longitudinal 
data on a sample of U.S. fi rms in the information 
technology sector from 1992 to 2003. This sample 
is drawn from the Forbes 500 list, which ranks U.S. 
fi rms by sales, profi ts, assets, and market value. Any 
fi rm that ranks among the top 500 on at least one of 
these criteria is included in the annual listing. We 
focus exclusively on IT fi rms in order to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the industry level and 
because many of the VC investments in this period 
were made in that sector, rendering IT fi rms more 
likely to pursue CVC initiatives (Gaba and Meyer, 
2008). The research sample was constructed in two 
steps. First, we compiled the names of all fi rms listed 
on the Forbes 500 for the years 1997 through 2003. 
Second, from this list we selected fi rms in the IT 
sector (based on the defi nition given in National 
Science Foundation, 2000), yielding a sample of 274 
IT companies. However, due to missing data on 
independent variables, the fi nal sample was reduced 
to 204 IT fi rms. Following Gompers and Lerner 
(2004), we chose the time period of our study to 
coincide with a more recent cycle in the venture 
capital industry—one that extended from 1992 to 
2003, and during which CVC units were adopted by 
71 of our sample fi rms. These 71 adopters constitute 
the risk set for the termination decision. The time of 
entry into the risk set is conditional on the year of 
CVC unit adoption. The termination analyses spans 
1992 to 2003, where 1992 is the earliest instance of 
adoption of a CVC unit. Of these 71 fi rms, 41 ter-
minated their CVC unit, while 30 retained them.
Dependent variables
We use two dependent variables in our study: adop-
tion of a CVC unit captures the decision to external-
ize R&D and termination of a CVC unit captures the 
reversal of this decision. We rely mainly on the 
Corporate Venturing Yearbook and Directory (2000, 
2001, 2002) to code adoption of CVC units. This 
directory lists all fi rms with a CVC unit and the year 
in which the CVC unit was established. Though a 
few IT fi rms experimented with CVC investments 
prior to establishing a formal CVC unit, it is the 
establishment of the CVC unit as a formally staffed 
entity that is the starting event of interest; this is 
because it entails a clear commitment to external-
izing R&D through a CVC unit.
We rely on the VentureXpert database to code 
termination of CVC units over time. VentureXpert 
classifi es the investment status of every CVC unit as 
‘defunct,’ ‘inactive,’ or ‘actively seeking new invest-
ments.’ The database gives the current investment 
status of each CVC unit, but it does not specify the 
date on which that status last changed. Therefore, 
our fi rst step was to take all fi rms classifi ed as 
‘defunct’ or ‘inactive’ and code them as having ter-
minated their CVC unit; fi rms classifi ed as ‘actively 
seeking new investments’ were coded as having 
retained their CVC unit. For those CVC units coded 
as terminated, we used the date of its last investment 
(as reported by VentureXpert) to identify the year of 
termination. Our next step was to examine the 
pattern of investments in entrepreneurial start-ups 
and use this information to reevaluate our coding. 
We found that some fi rms—despite being classifi ed 
as ‘actively seeking new investments’—had ceased 
making investments in entrepreneurial start-ups. In 
open-ended interviews with CVC managers, we 
were told that when an IT fi rm stops investing in 
start-ups for at least two calendar years, its CVC unit 
is nearly always terminated. We chose to be more 
conservative and recoded any active fi rm as instead 
having terminated its CVC unit if the parent fi rm had 
made no such investments (follow-up or new) for at 
least four years; in these cases, we coded the fi rst 
year in this interval as the year of termination. 
184 V. Gaba and S. Bhattacharya
Copyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society Strat. Entrepreneurship J., 6: 178–199 (2012)
 DOI: 10.1002/sej
Thereby, the number of fi rms terminating their CVC 
unit increased by six.3 Overall, we are confi dent 
about identifying termination of CVC units even 
though the year of termination may be measured 
with some error.4
Independent variables
Innovation performance
The innovation performance of a fi rm can be mea-
sured in several ways, with indicators that include 
the number of patents, patent citations, and new 
product introductions, as well as the percentage of 
the fi rm’s sales or profi ts from new products. We use 
patent data here because they are easily available, 
cover both product and process innovations, and are 
subject to a rigorous screening process by fi rm engi-
neers, patent lawyers, and patent offi ce offi cials—all 
of whom evaluate the patent’s novelty, usefulness, 
and nonobviousness.5
Raw patent counts are widely accepted indicators 
for comparing fi rms’ innovative performance in 
terms of new technologies, processes, and products 
(Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 
2003; Czarnitzki, Ebersberger, and Fier, 2007). 
Ahuja and Katila (2001) use patent counts as a 
measure of innovation performance and posit that 
patents are closely related to new product introduc-
tions, invention counts, sales growth, and expert 
ratings of technological strength. The main weak-
nesses of the patent count measure are that it treats 
all patents as equally valuable and does not account 
for interindustry differences in the propensity to fi le 
patents. Therefore, we follow Kortum (1993) and 
measure fi rms’ innovation performance as the 
patent/R&D ratio: for a given year, the number of 
patents applied for divided by R&D expenditures.6 
Kortum and Lerner (2000) suggest using patent 
applications, not patent stock, because this controls 
for unobserved factors (e.g., the arrival of techno-
logical opportunities) that could bias the results. 
Gompers and Lerner (2004) recommend normaliz-
ing patents by R&D expenditure since it eliminates 
technological opportunity effects, and it controls for 
scale effects while facilitating comparisons across 
fi rms and industries characterized by varying levels 
of R&D inputs and technological opportunities.
Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) argue that the 
large variance observed in the value or signifi cance 
of individual patents renders patent counts a rela-
tively noisy proxy for innovation performance. They 
recommend citations-weighted patents instead as an 
indicator of the importance or quality of individual 
patents. There is a strong empirical correlation 
between the number of citations made to a patent 
and the value of the underlying invention (Trajtenberg, 
1990), and citation-weighted patent stocks are more 
highly correlated with the fi rm’s market value than 
are raw patent counts (Hall et al., 2001). This is why 
we also use the ratio of citation-weighted patents to 
R&D expenditures as an alternative measure of the 
‘quality’ of innovation performance.
We use patent application fi ling dates to assign a 
patent to a fi rm in a given year. Patent counts are 
obtained from the database compiled by Hall et al. 
(2001), which contains information on all utility 
patents granted from January 1, 1963 to December 
30, 1999. We augment the Hall et al. (2001) data set 
by collecting primary data on patent applications in 
the years 2000 to 2003 directly from the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Offi ce Web site. For citation-
weighted patents, we use a more recent National 
Bureau of Economic Research patent database con-
taining information on all citations made to patents 
issued from 1976 to 2006. We fi rst identify the set 
of patents held by each fi rm in our sample in each 
year. Next, we identify forward citations to all 
patents in this set from other citing patents at time 
of application for the citing patents (excluding self-
citations) to calculate a time-varying measure of 
3
 Additional checks were performed to assess the overall accu-
racy of our coding. First, we confi rmed its classifi cations by 
referring to industry newsletters, fi rm Web sites, and the results 
of LexisNexis searches. Second, for each fi rm classifi ed as 
having terminated a CVC unit, we confi rmed that the fi rm made 
no new investments between its coded termination date and 
2008.
4
 Hausman, Abrevayab, and Scott-Morton (1998) show that, for 
discrete choice models, traditional marginal effect estimates 
made in the presence of measurement error provide only a 
lower bound (in absolute terms) of the ‘true’ marginal effects.
5
 Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) show that there are no system-
atic disparities among these measures and that a composite 
measure of these variables clearly captures a latent measure of 
the fi rm’s innovation performance. They also fi nd a strong 
statistical overlap between R&D inputs, patent counts, patent 
citations, and new product introductions, thereby demonstrat-
ing that—for high-tech industries at least—any of these indica-
tors serves equally well to measure a fi rm’s innovation 
performance.
6
 Pakes (1985) and Hall, Griliches, and Hausman (1986) fi nd a 
contemporaneous relation between R&D expenditures and 
patent applications for U.S. fi rms, so we scale patent applica-
tions at time t by contemporaneous R&D expenditures at time t. 
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citation-weighted patents. Finally, we correct for the 
truncation of post-2000 cites (newer patents are 
likely to receive fewer citations) by applying a mul-
tiplier to the number of citations, as recommended 
by Hall et al. (2001). We also converted nominal 
R&D expenditures into real terms to account for 
infl ation, so that it is expressed in 1992 dollars.
Aspiration levels
We calculate aspiration levels for each of these inno-
vation performance measures. Aspirations can arise 
from two types of comparisons: historical and social. 
Historical aspiration uses the focal fi rm’s past per-
formance as an indicator of how well it should 
perform, while social aspiration uses the perfor-
mance of comparable other fi rms as the reference 
level (Cyert and March, 1963). We defi ne fi rm i’s 
social aspiration metric, Sit, as the simple average of 
the innovation performance of all other fi rms in fi rm 
i’s three-digit Standard Industrial Classifi cation 
(SIC) code (Greve, 2003b; Chen and Miller, 2007);7 
and we defi ne fi rm i’s historical aspiration as an 
exponentially weighted moving average of its past 
innovation performance. If we denote Pit as the inno-
vation performance of fi rm i at time t and α an 
adjustment parameter, then historical aspiration is 
given by Ait = αPit + (1 − α)Ait−1. High values of α 
indicate that aspirations are updated rapidly, with 
higher weights given to more recent performance; 
low values correspond to slower updating and 
greater emphasis on past performance. To assess the 
sensitivity of our results to this parameter, we esti-
mate specifi cations using α-values ranging from 
0.05 to 0.95 in step sizes of 0.05. For each model, 
we use the value of α that yields the highest model 
log-likelihood (Greve, 2003b); these values are α = 
0.1 for the adoption model and α = 0.25 for the 
termination model.
Innovation performance relative to aspiration levels
We implement a spline function to compare slopes 
above and below the aspiration level (cf. Greve, 
2003b; Chen and Miller, 2007). This is done by 
splitting the social and the historical innovation 
performance variables into two variables each. Thus, 
innovation performance above social aspiration is 
equal to 0 for all observations when the focal fi rm’s 
innovation performance is less than its social 
aspiration level and equals the difference between 
its innovation performance and social aspirations 
when the innovation performance is above social 
aspirations; innovation performance below social 
aspiration is defi ned symmetrically. Inno vation 
performance above historical aspiration and inno-
vation performance below historical aspiration are 
defi ned exactly in the same way except that per-
formance is calculated relative to historical aspira-
tion Ait.
Control variables
To isolate our theorized variables’ impact on CVC 
adoption and termination, we control for a number 
of fi rm- and industry-level variables.
Firm-level controls
For both adoption and termination models, we use 
return on assets (ROA) to control for fi nancial per-
formance relative to aspirations. We spline ROA into 
fi nancial performance above social aspiration and 
fi nancial performance below social aspiration, just 
as we did for innovation performance. This allows 
us to evaluate the effect of fi nancial performance 
relative to aspirations on the likelihood of CVC 
adoption and termination. Next, because the deci-
sion to establish CVC units may be related to other 
alternative modes of externalizing R&D (Dushnitsky 
and Lavie, 2010; Tong and Li, 2011), we include 
count measures of the number of R&D alliances and 
technology acquisitions (including only the acquisi-
tions of IT sector fi rms) from the SDC Platinum 
database. Slack represents a reserve of resources that 
can induce fi rms both to adopt and sustain CVC 
units. We use available slack as measured by the 
fi rm’s current ratio—that is, the ratio of its current 
assets to liabilities (Bromiley, 1991).8 Older fi rms 
fi nd it diffi cult to keep up with externally generated 
technical changes and, thus, exhibit greater inertia 
(Abernathy and Utterback, 1978); hence we control 
for age by counting years since a fi rm’s founding. 
Because larger fi rms have typically amassed suffi -
cient resources to enable strategic change (Veugelers 
7
 Using the median innovation performance of fi rms in the same 
three-digit SIC code does not change our results.
8
 We also used two alternate measures of slack: absorbed slack, 
measured as the ratio of sales, general, and administrative 
expense to sales; and potential slack, measured as the debt/
equity ratio. Neither of these measures yielded signifi cant 
results.
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and Cassiman, 1999), we control for fi rm size as 
measured by total corporate sales.
Firms that are closer to VC ‘clusters’ are better 
positioned to identify investment opportunities and 
may also fi nd it easier to staff their CVC units 
(Gaba and Meyer, 2008); hence, we control for 
geographic distance to VC clusters, where the 
distance is a weighted average of the number of 
miles from corporate headquarters to the three 
primary VC clusters (Silicon Valley, Route 128, 
and New York).9 The weights used were the density 
of VC funds targeting IT start-ups in each cluster, 
lagged by one year. Firms that were themselves 
founded with venture capital funding may have a 
congenital affi nity for CVC units (Gaba and Meyer, 
2008), so we measure venture backed as an indi-
cator variable set equal to ‘1’ if the focal fi rm 
was backed by private VC funding prior to its 
fi rst IPO (and to ‘0’ otherwise). Finally, a fi rm’s 
decision to adopt or terminate a CVC unit may 
be infl uenced by the availability of investment 
opportunities in start-ups (Katila, Rosenberger, and 
Eisenhardt, 2008). We construct a measure of local 
investment opportunities for each fi rm, headquar-
tered in state k in year t, as the number of entre-
preneurial start-ups that received VC investments 
in state k in year t − 1.
In the termination model, we also control for per-
formance of the CVC unit because high-performing 
units are less likely to be terminated. We measure 
this variable by cumulating the number of CVC-
backed acquisitions by each fi rm, lagged by one year 
(Gaba and Meyer, 2008). We constructed this vari-
able by obtaining a list of all private acquisitions 
from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database by 
all the CVC adopters in our sample for each year 
from 1992 through 2003. We then match these 
acquisitions by each CVC adopter, including only 
those targets in which CVC units had invested during 
the time period of the study. We also control for a 
fi rm’s commitment to CVC investing; following 
Benson and Ziedonis (2009) we create a CVC stabil-
ity index that, for each year t, is the proportion of 
years a fi rm invested in entrepreneurial start-ups 
since it fi rst adopted a CVC unit.
Industry-level controls
We control for contagion effects by measuring the 
number of prior adopters (in the adoption model) 
and prior abandoners (in the termination model) in 
the same three-digit industry sector, lagged by one 
year (Meyer and Gaba, 2008). Since prominent fi rms 
are regarded as more worthy of imitation, we use the 
average sales of prior adopters and abandoners in the 
same three-digit industry sector as a measure of 
prominent adopters and prominent abandoners in 
the model estimates (Greve, 2003b). We include the 
number of citation-weighted patents applied for in 
each four-digit industry (corrected for truncation) as 
a measure of technological opportunities (Dushnitsky 
and Lenox, 2005). This variable also allows us to 
control for patent and citation infl ation in certain 
technology subsectors.10 Finally, we use industry 
dummies at the three-digit SIC level in both the 
adoption and termination models to control for 
varying propensities to patent across industries and 
for the strength of intellectual property protection in 
the fi rm’s industry sector (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 
2005).
Temporal controls
Because the VC industry cycles through booms and 
busts (Gompers and Lerner, 2004), we include time 
dummies for the years 1999 and 2000 in the adop-
tion model and for the years 2001 and 2002 in the 
termination model.11 We also account for such cycles 
in public equity markets via the value-weighted 
annual return on NASDAQ.
Table 1a (Table 1b) gives summary statistics and 
correlations between the independent variables for 
the adoption (termination) model.
Models
Adoption model
We use a discrete time event history methodology 
to model the adoption of CVC units (cf. Allison, 
1982). We estimate Pi adopt(t), the conditional 
9
 ‘Silicon Valley’ comprises the California counties of Alameda, 
Contra Costa, Marin, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa 
Clara; ‘Route 128’ comprises the Massachusetts counties of 
Essex, Middlesex, Suffolk, and Norfolk; and ‘New York’ con-
sists of that state’s counties of New York, Bronx, Kings, 
Queens, and Richmond.
10
 As a robustness check, we reestimated our adoption and ter-
mination models for the sample of hardware and software fi rms 
separately. For both subsamples, the coeffi cients on innovation 
performance-aspiration gap are similar to the results shown in 
Tables 2 and 3 with the pooled sample.
11
 Including time dummies should also control for heightened 
uncertainty at the time of the dot-com crash. Other year 
dummies had no signifi cant effects.
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probability that fi rm i adopts the CVC unit in year t 
in a probit specifi cation. According to Allison (1982), 
this methodology is preferred when information on 
the exact timing of an event is unavailable (i.e., when 
interval censoring exists; note that we have data only 
on the year of adoption). Another advantage of this 
method is that non-adopting fi rms contribute to the 
regression model exactly what is known about them, 
so right censoring is moot. According to the Corporate 
Venturing Yearbook, none of our sample fi rms had 
established a CVC unit before 1992, although 
VentureXpert reported that six of them did make 
venture investments before then. Half of these six 
simply made a one-off investment and did not invest 
consistently until their coded adoption date. The 
remaining three fi rms made a series of investments 
in the early 1980s but then ceased investing and did 
not resume until after 1992. Our results are robust 
to the exclusion of these last three fi rms. Overall, 
left censoring is less likely to be a serious problem.
Termination model
The dependent variable for this model, P ti
terminate ( ), 
is the conditional probability that fi rm i terminated 
the CVC unit in year t, given that it is at risk of 
termination. We employ the Heckman (1979) selec-
tion procedure, which corrects for sample selection 
bias and yields estimates that are both consistent and 
asymptotically effi cient. For our termination model, 
this procedure involves two equations: the fi rst esti-
mates the probability that the fi rm adopted a CVC 
unit (i.e., is in the risk set); the second predicts the 
probability of termination conditional on having 
adopted it. We use maximum likelihood to simulta-
neously estimate these two equations, where we 
assume that the errors are distributed as bivariate 
normal with correlation ρ. In identifying the model, 
we rely on exclusion restrictions and not on nonlin-
earity of the error terms. We also test ρ = 0 to evalu-
ate the appropriateness of the Heckman procedure. 
For both models, standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering on fi rms.
RESULTS
Adoption model estimates
Table 2 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of 
fi ve models predicting likelihood of adoption of a 
CVC unit at time t as a function of each fi rm’s inno-
vation performance relative to its aspiration levels at 
time t − 1.
Model 1 presents our baseline specifi cation with 
the control variables; Model 2 adds the two mea-
sures of innovation performance relative to social 
aspirations. According to H1, innovation perfor-
mance improvement above social aspirations makes 
fi rms less likely to adopt CVC units, and the nega-
tive and signifi cant coeffi cient for innovation perfor-
mance above social aspiration provides support for 
this hypothesis. Hypothesis 2 argued that for innova-
tion performance decreases below aspirations, fi rms 
are more willing to adopt CVC units; hence, we 
expect a negative and signifi cant coeffi cient for 
innovation performance below social aspiration. 
However, the positive and signifi cant coeffi cient for 
this variable indicates that performance deteriora-
tion below aspirations makes fi rms less likely to 
adopt a CVC unit, so H2 is not supported. A Wald 
test rejects equality of the coeffi cients for the two 
innovation performance measures at the 1 percent 
level. In terms of the magnitude of effects, a 1 
percent deterioration in innovation performance 
below social aspirations reduces the probability of 
CVC adoption by 0.2 percent, whereas a 1 percent 
improvement in performance above social aspira-
tions reduces the probability of adoption by 0.16 
percent. Finally, a Wald test of model fi t improve-
ment (over Model 1) yields a chi-squared statistic of 
8.67, which is signifi cant at the 5 percent level (see 
the last row of Table 2).
Model 3 presents results for innovation perfor-
mance relative to social aspirations using the ratio 
of citation-weighted patents to R&D expenditures as 
the innovation performance measure; the results are 
nearly indistinguishable from those for Model 2, 
where we used a patent count measure. Once again, 
we fi nd support for H1, but not for H2. The calcu-
lated average marginal effects reveal that a 1 percent 
deterioration in innovation performance below 
social aspiration levels reduces the probability of 
CVC adoption by 0.37 percent, whereas a 1 percent 
improvement in performance above social aspira-
tions reduces that probability by 0.1 percent.
Models 4 and 5 use the same two innovation per-
formance measures, but calculate the performance-
aspiration gap with respect to historical rather than 
social aspirations. For both of these models, we 
obtain a negative coeffi cient for innovation perfor-
mance above historical aspiration and a positive 
coeffi cient for innovation performance below 
historical aspiration. This mirrors our fi ndings for 
social aspirations, but here the results are much 
weaker in terms of statistical signifi cance. For 
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Table 2. Innovation performance and adoption of CVC units
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of 
patents
Citation-wtd. 
patents
Number of 
patents
Citation-wtd. 
patents
Innovation performance-social 
aspiration (above aspirations)
−1.240*** −0.229**
(0.436) (0.104)
Innovation performance-social 
aspiration (below aspirations)
1.054** 1.368***
(0.536) (0.361)
Innovation performance-historical 
aspiration (above aspirations)
−0.747* −0.039
(0.393) (0.065)
Innovation performance-historical 
aspiration (below aspirations)
0.454 1.772*
(0.382) (1.018)
Controls
Financial performance-social aspiration 
(above aspirations)
3.983*** 4.368*** 4.330*** 4.148*** 4.100***
(0.952) (0.965) (0.959) (0.958) (0.953)
Financial performance-social aspiration 
(below aspirations)
16.033 12.465 9.124 14.094 16.001
(37.500) (36.042) (27.793) (36.195) (37.087)
Prior adopters in three-digit industry 0.349*** 0.361*** 0.363*** 0.351*** 0.348***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Prominent prior adopters in three-digit 
industry
0.190** 0.184** 0.206** 0.192** 0.191**
(0.077) (0.075) (0.081) (0.079) (0.078)
Number of R&D alliances 0.137*** 0.125*** 0.120*** 0.134*** 0.134***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Number of acquisitions 0.035 0.033 0.035 0.038 0.040
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Slack 1.067*** 1.232*** 1.154*** 1.056*** 1.072***
(0.165) (0.159) (0.167) (0.165) (0.169)
Age −0.242** −0.228** −0.287** −0.230** −0.253**
(0.112) (0.113) (0.113) (0.112) (0.112)
Sales 0.587*** 0.638*** 0.586*** 0.584*** 0.579***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070)
Distance from VC cluster −0.066 −0.066 −0.057 −0.070* −0.078*
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Venture backed 0.083 0.034 0.010 0.070 0.039
(0.196) (0.196) (0.201) (0.197) (0.196)
Local investment opportunity −0.002 −0.004 0.001 −0.004 −0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Citation weighted patent in 
three-digit industry
1.449** 1.458** 1.930*** 1.483** 1.442**
(0.596) (0.617) (0.711) (0.615) (0.605)
NASDAQ return (value weighted) 1.231*** 1.359*** 1.160*** 1.353*** 1.314***
(0.430) (0.437) (0.437) (0.438) (0.430)
Dummy = 1 for 1999 1.299** 1.426** 1.292** 1.453** 1.401**
(0.586) (0.592) (0.608) (0.598) (0.587)
Dummy = 1 for 2000 1.474*** 1.565*** 1.624*** 1.649*** 1.559***
(0.571) (0.583) (0.609) (0.587) (0.576)
Observations 1424 1424 1424 1424 1424
No. of adopters 71 71 71 71 71
Model log likelihood −201.39 −197.06 −198.85 −200.61 −200.13
LR test for difference from Model 
1(x2(2))
8.67** 5.07* 1.56 2.51
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * signifi cant at 10%; ** signifi cant at 5%; *** signifi cant at 1%; All columns include industry 
dummies and a constant (not shown).
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performance above (below) aspirations, the only sig-
nifi cant coeffi cient is that for the patent count 
measure (the citation-weighted patent measure) of 
innovation performance. The last row of the table 
indicates no improvement in fi t for the models based 
on historical aspirations when compared with Model 
1, which incorporates only the control variables.
Figure 1 plots the Table 2 estimates for Model 2 
over the range of observed gaps between innovation 
performance and social aspiration levels. The hori-
zontal axis denotes this performance-aspiration gap; 
the vertical axis denotes our estimated probability of 
CVC adoption (evaluated at the means of all vari-
ables). The probability of adoption forms an inverted-
V shape: above the aspiration level, improvements 
in innovation performance reduce the probability of 
CVC adoption; below the aspiration level, deteriora-
tions in innovation performance also reduce the 
adoption probability.
Termination model estimates
Heckman estimates for the conditional probability 
of CVC unit termination are shown in Table 3, which 
reports our estimates of the termination equation. 
Model 1 in this table presents coeffi cient estimates 
for the control variables only; Model 2 adds the 
innovation performance relative to social aspirations 
with innovation performance measured as the ratio 
of patents to R&D expenditure. In H3, it is argued 
that, for innovation performance above aspirations, 
an increasing gap increases the likelihood of CVC 
termination; the positive coeffi cient for innovation 
performance above social aspiration supports this 
hypothesis. Similarly, the negative coeffi cient for 
innovation performance below social aspiration 
indicates that, in this case too, an increase in the 
performance-aspiration gap biases fi rms toward 
CVC unit termination. Thus, we fi nd support for H4 
as well.
For the magnitude of these effects, we fi nd an 
identical increase of 0.28 percent in the (conditional) 
probability of termination in response to a 1 percent 
increase in innovation performance for fi rms above 
their social aspiration level and to a 1 percent decline 
in performance for fi rms below their social aspira-
tion level. The third-to-last row of Table 3 rejects the 
null hypothesis that our two estimation equations are 
independent, which validates our choice of the 
Heckman model for correcting sample selection 
bias. We have ρ < 0, implying that any unobservable 
factors that bias a fi rm toward CVC adoption also 
make subsequent termination less likely. The last 
row of the table shows that our innovation perfor-
mance variables improve model fi t when compared 
with Model 1.
In Model 3 of this table, we use the proportion of 
citation-weighted patents to R&D expenditure as our 
innovation performance measure. The negative 
coeffi cient for innovation performance below aspi-
rations implies that, in this case, an increasing gap 
increases the probability of termination. The corre-
sponding coeffi cient for performance above aspira-
tions has the correct sign, but is not signifi cant. 
Models 4 and 5 examine the effect of innovation 
performance relative to historical aspirations and 
have little effect on the likelihood of CVC termina-
tion. The relevant coeffi cients have the same signs 
as in Models 2 and 3, but only one of them is statis-
tically signifi cant. Overall, we fi nd the strongest 
Figure 1. Innovation performance relative to social aspiration and CVC adoption
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Table 3. Innovation performance and termination of CVC units
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of 
patents
Citation-wtd. 
patents
Number of 
patents
Citation-wtd. 
patents
Innovation performance-social aspiration 
(above aspiration)
0.894* 0.048
(0.524) (0.089)
Innovation performance-social aspiration 
(below aspiration)
−0.890* −0.173***
(0.539) (0.058)
Innovation performance-historical 
aspiration (above aspiration)
0.535 0.346*
(0.583) (0.212)
Innovation performance-historical 
aspiration (below aspiration)
−1.577 −0.106
(1.638) (0.114)
Controls 
Financial performance-social aspiration 
(above aspirations)
−13.879 −1.168 −8.949 −4.870 −12.710
(14.396) (11.078) (14.291) (20.405) (18.471)
Financial performance-social aspiration 
(below aspirations)
0.524 −5.594 −7.484 −4.399 −4.876
(12.119) (12.372) (14.073) (12.085) (15.134)
Prior abandoners in three-digit industry 0.042* 0.021*** 0.028 0.031 0.048*
(0.025) (0.007) (0.020) (0.030) (0.028)
Prominent prior abandoners in three-digit 
industry
0.332* 0.196 0.249 0.250 0.371**
(0.171) (0.156) (0.194) (0.251) (0.153)
Number of R&D alliances −0.295* −0.282** −0.256* −0.230 −0.303
(0.173) (0.118) (0.134) (0.168) (0.199)
Number of acquisitions −0.146** −0.152*** −0.146*** −0.152*** −0.139*
(0.063) (0.043) (0.051) (0.057) (0.073)
Slack −0.063 −0.072 −0.048 −0.049 −0.009
(0.099) (0.076) (0.085) (0.085) (0.119)
Age −0.390*** −0.380*** −0.351*** −0.361*** −0.339**
(0.138) (0.087) (0.099) (0.109) (0.146)
Sales −0.056 −0.030 −0.030 −0.043 −0.061
(0.060) (0.046) (0.052) (0.059) (0.056)
Distance from VC cluster 0.090*** 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.090*** 0.092***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013)
Venture backed −0.231 −0.206** −0.203* −0.166* −0.213
(0.160) (0.085) (0.117) (0.092) (0.153)
Local investment opportunity 0.011 0.001 0.008 0.005 0.001
(0.017) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018)
CVC acquisitions −0.019 −0.016 −0.015 −0.015 −0.021
(0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020)
CVC stability −0.105 −0.086 −0.078 −0.119 −0.046
(0.183) (0.113) (0.148) (0.146) (0.168)
NASDAQ return (value weighted) 0.792 0.596 0.744 0.683 0.744
(0.647) (0.638) (0.669) (0.665) (0.669)
Dummy = 1 for 2001 0.485 0.192 0.354 0.253 0.560
(0.415) (0.416) (0.467) (0.559) (0.490)
Dummy = 1 for 2002 −0.727*** −0.767*** −0.759*** −0.722*** −0.493*
(0.192) (0.240) (0.181) (0.125) (0.284)
Observations 1582 1582 1582 1582 1582
Uncensored observations 229 229 229 229 229
No. of abandoners 41 41 41 41 41
Wald test for independence of equations: 
ρ (x2(1))
−0.89* −0.98* −0.95* −0.94* −0.85*
Model log likelihood −98.27 −79.99 −79.84 −79.87 −79.48
LR test for difference from Model 1(x2(2)) 36.55*** 36.85*** 36.79*** 37.57***
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * signifi cant at 10%; ** signifi cant at 5%; *** signifi cant at 1%; All columns include industry 
dummies and a constant (not shown).
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support for H3 and H4 in the model that measures 
innovation performance as a proportion of patent 
counts to R&D expenditure and the performance gap 
relative to social aspirations.
Figure 2 plots the Table 3 estimates for Model 2 
over the range of observed performance-aspiration 
gaps. The horizontal axis denotes innovation per-
formance relative to social aspirations and the verti-
cal axis denotes our estimated probability of CVC 
termination (evaluated at the means of all variables). 
The estimated coeffi cients for our innovation per-
formance variables yield a V-shaped relationship: 
the probability of CVC termination is increasing 
with the performance gap both above and below 
aspirations.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we draw on the behavioral theory of 
the fi rm to posit conditions under which the organi-
zational risks associated with pursuing a CVC unit 
become more or less acceptable to decision makers 
under strong institutional pressure to adopt and ter-
minate CVC units. Our analysis offers insights into 
how managerial aspirations for innovation-related 
goals affect the adoption and termination of these 
units.
Innovation performance feedback 
and CVC units
First, we fi nd that if innovation performance is above 
aspirations, then the fi rm is less likely to adopt a 
CVC unit; if one had previously been adopted, it is 
Figure 2. Innovation performance relative to social aspiration and CVC termination
more likely to terminate it. This suggests that fi rms 
with high innovation performance see only limited 
benefi ts to accessing external sources of innovative 
ideas and technologies.
Second, contrary to our expectation, we fi nd that 
if innovation performance is below aspirations, then 
fi rms are also less likely to adopt a CVC unit. 
However, if a CVC unit was adopted previously, the 
fi rm is more likely to terminate it, as predicted. 
These mixed results for innovation performance 
below aspirations suggest the need for a more 
nuanced view of fi rms’ motivations for pursing 
external R&D. One reason that fi rms with poor inno-
vation performance forgo alternative mechanisms, 
such as CVC units, could be that negative perfor-
mance feedback is interpreted as a threat (Milliken 
and Lant, 1991) that inhibits cognitive processes, 
restricts decision making, and limits the number of 
alternatives considered, thereby reducing the likeli-
hood of change while increasing preference for the 
status quo (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981). 
Firms may then ‘fail to consider alternative responses 
that are not well understood, whose outcome is 
highly ambiguous, and for which a probability dis-
tribution is not well defi ned’ (Ocasio, 1995: 297), 
responding instead with behavior that is risk averse 
(Sitkin and Pablo, 1992) and/or internally oriented 
(Chattopadhyay, Glick, and Huber, 2001). In such 
situations, fi rms are unable to commit the resources 
for—or adapt their routines associated with—R&D 
externalization.
Third, we fi nd that innovation performance 
relative to social aspirations matters more than his-
torical aspirations in predicting both CVC adoption 
and termination. This dominance of social over 
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historical aspirations suggests that fi rms externalize 
R&D with attention to external, not internal, stan-
dards of innovation performance. Although aspira-
tions were originally conceived in terms of a 
weighted function of both past own performance and 
the performance of others (Cyert and March, 1963), 
recent research has focused on distinguishing 
between historical and social comparisons (Greve, 
2003b). Much evidence suggests that fi rms’ aspira-
tions are motivated by both comparison types, 
however, it is unclear which dominates. Some 
studies report social aspirations (Mishina et al., 
2010) and others the historical (Audia and Brion, 
2007); still others report equivalence (Iyer and 
Miller, 2008). These differences may be conditional 
on industries, economic conditions, time periods, 
and/or methods for selecting the comparison group 
(Shinkle, forthcoming). For example, historical 
comparisons may predominate in mature industries 
with established incumbents, whereas social com-
parisons may be more signifi cant in dynamic indus-
tries such as information technology. Future studies 
should investigate this issue further.
Taken together, our fi ndings indicate that a fi rm is 
more likely to adopt and less likely to terminate 
CVC units when its innovation performance is near 
its social aspirations. Our fi ndings are similar 
whether innovation performance is measured in 
terms of the quantity or the quality of innovation 
performance.
Motives for externalizing R&D via CVC units
Examining the patterns of results across models, 
we also fi nd that, fi rst, there are strong institutional 
pressures to adopt and terminate CVC units. Thus, 
a high number of prior and prominent adopters 
(abandoners) increase the focal fi rm’s propensity to 
adopt (terminate) a CVC unit. In line with prior 
studies, our research emphasizes the importance of 
institutional pressures as a determinant of organi-
zational behavior (Strang and Meyer, 1993; Strang 
and Soule, 1998). However, our fi ndings also 
suggest fi rm-level heterogeneity in responsiveness 
to such pressures: fi rms do not respond uniformly 
to them, but rather adopt and terminate CVC units 
depending on performance relative to their goals. 
In particular, fi rms whose innovation performance 
is far below or far above aspirations will resist 
these pressures and so be less likely to adopt (and 
more likely to terminate) CVC units—perhaps 
because they view the status quo as a less risky 
alternative to R&D externalization via CVC units. 
Thus, our fi ndings indicate that organizational goals, 
performance feedback, and managerial tolerance for 
risks are critical components of organizational 
responsiveness.12 Second, with respect to CVC 
adoption, we fi nd that for fi nancial performance 
above aspirations, fi rms are more likely to adopt 
CVC units as their own performance improves. This 
fi nding suggests that better-performing fi rms are 
more likely to adopt CVC units. In contrast, per-
formance relative to fi nancial goals has no effect 
on the decision to terminate such units. This 
fi nding—in conjunction with our main results that 
managerial aspirations for innovation-related goals 
have a signifi cant effect on the fi rm’s decision to 
adopt and terminate CVC units—indicates that con-
siderations of how different goals fi t organizational 
search and risk tolerance allow for more specifi c 
conclusions. Goals that are close to a given orga-
nizational activity and decision-making context, 
such as R&D externalization, will likely be more 
effective in identifying performance problems and 
locating solutions. Future research could investigate 
this issue further by examining the relationships 
among multiple goals and their consequences for 
problem solving, search, and risk taking.
Implications for technology entrepreneurship
Our study has implications for technology entrepre-
neurship research. First, by investigating the deci-
sions to adopt and to terminate CVC units, we offer 
a more comprehensive and nuanced explanation of 
when fi rms are motivated to externalize R&D via 
such units. Second, both the academic and popular 
literature has documented a variety of innovation-
related benefi ts of CVC investing (Basu et al., 
forthcoming). Our study supports this view by dem-
onstrating that managerial aspirations for innovation 
performance goals are an important driver of CVC 
12
 We also evaluated the relative importance of the behavioral 
and institutional explanations. In terms of magnitude of effects, 
we fi nd that the marginal effect of the performance feedback 
variables exceeds (in absolute terms) the marginal effect of the 
contagion variables. We also reestimated each model for alter-
nate time frames, splitting the time coverage from 1992 to a 
different end year spanning 1997 to 2003. Time splits such as 
1992 to 1997 would mainly include early adopters, whereas a 
split such as 1992 to 2001 would focus on all adopters. The 
performance feedback variables are signifi cant in all subsam-
ples and are consistent in terms of sign and signifi cance regard-
less of whether we confi ne the adopters to early adopters or 
not.
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activity within fi rms. Third, prior CVC research 
fi nds a positive relationship between a fi rm’s 
technological resources and levels of CVC invest-
ments (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005; Basu, Phelps, 
and Kotha, 2011); higher levels of such resources 
predispose fi rms to pursue CVC because they have 
the capacity to identify and absorb ‘appropriate’ 
external technologies. Our study complements this 
research by emphasizing the behavioral motivation 
to adopt and continue with a CVC unit. In sum, CVC 
initiatives within fi rms are jointly determined by 
both the motivation and the ability to tap external 
sources of knowledge.
CONCLUSION
Even though external R&D is viewed as a crucial 
element of fi rms’ innovation strategies, researchers 
are only beginning to understand the conditions 
under which fi rms are more or less likely to pursue 
it. This study suggests that a behavioral perspective 
provides a compelling account of the conditions 
under which decision makers are likely to accept the 
risk and uncertainty associated with externalizing 
R&D. Given the recent emphasis on creating and 
sustaining technological competitiveness by tapping 
into external markets for ideas, it is interesting that 
a fi rm’s decision to externalize R&D is driven by 
managerial aspirations for innovation-related goals. 
In short, a fi rm is most likely to adopt and sustain a 
CVC unit when its innovation performance is closest 
to that of its peers.
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